Covenant Administration and Analogy

In discussions of covenant theology and baptism, there are some paedobaptists who ground the practice of infant baptism on an overall consideration of the unity of redemptive history. It is an argument from analogy. “As it was then, so it is now.” We are told that generic paradigms such as God’s dealings with Abraham, or an oikos principle (it goes by various names), establish the specific practice of baptism in the church. This kind of argumentation grounds covenant administration on an analogy.

The argument from analogy may seem persuasive because it appeals to a true unity in redemptive history, but the argument itself fails careful examination and its methodology opens a door for unlimited arguments of the same nature (such as paedocommunion).

To prove this (and not merely assert it), I offer several pages from a book written in 1654 by John Tombes, a well-known Anglican clergyman who came to antipaedobaptist convictions. Tombes interacted a great deal with the divines of his day. In the text below, Tombes is mostly responding to Stephen Marshall and Richard Baxter. The basic arguments go like this: Tombes’ argues:

If all of the ceremonial laws are abrogated, then a ceremonial law such as circumcision cannot bind the church.

But all of the ceremonial laws are abrogated,

Therefore circumcision does not bind the church.

Stephen Marshall answers:

Where there is an analogy between ordinances, there is an obligation of practice.

But there is an analogy between the practice of circumcision and that of baptism.

Therefore the practice of circumcision binds the church.

Tombes answers:

The institution of a positive law, not analogy, dictates how it is to be observed.

Arguments that ground the observation of positive laws on analogy have no clear boundaries or guidelines, as evidenced by paedobaptists’ diversity of thought on paedobaptism itself.

Tombes asserts that paedobaptists forget their own principles when they make these arguments based on analogy. The antipaedobaptist view of positive law is not at all unique to Baptists or antipaedobaptists. It is an application of Protestant Reformed theology itself to the issue of baptism.

Tombes also pushes back at Marshall’s attempt to make circumcision a part of the substance of the covenant, noting that this is supposed, not proved, and it is contradicted in other ways in Marshall’s arguments.

What follows below, in updated spelling, is John Tombes, Anti-pædobaptism, or, The second part of the full review of the dispute concerning infant-baptism in which the invalidity of arguments is shewed, 11-16. Most of the elements in italics are either proper names or quotations which Tombes is including from other authors (mostly Stephen Marshall).

The Assembly at Westminster in their Confession of faith, chap. 25. Art. 4. alleges but one text out of the old Testament, viz. Gen. 17. 7. 9. for admission of Infants by Baptism into the visible Church. And if Mr. Marshall their Champion in this Point express their minds, they deduce Infant-baptism from this principle, All God’s Commands and Institutions about the Sacraments of the Jews bind us as much as they did them in all things which belong to the substance of the Covenant, and were not accidental to them. Which how false it is, how contrary to the Tenet of Divines former and later, is shewed in my Examen, part 3. Sect. 12. to which I may add the Assemblies confession of faith, chap. 19. Art. 3. All which ceremonial laws are now abrogated under the New Testament. And if all of them be abrogated, how can it be true that the law about circumcising Infants still binds? But Mr. Marshall in his Defence pag. 195. conceives his argument good from the analogy of the Ceremonial law of Circumcision, which he calls his Analogical argument, pag. 201.

On the contrary I deny any argument from analogy of the Ceremonial law good in mere positive ceremonies to prove thus it was in the old Testament, therefore it must be so in the new. And thus I argue,

1. Arguments from Analogy in mere positive Rites of the old Testament to make rules for observing mere positive Ceremonies of the new without institution gathered by precept or apostolical example or other declaration in the new Testament, do suppose that without Institution there may be par ratio, a like reason of the use of the one Ceremony as the other. But this is not true; For in positive Rites there is no reason for the use of this and not another thing in this manner to this end, by, or to persons, but the will of the appointer. For there is not anything natural or moral in them; they have no general equity; they are supposed to be merely not mixtly positive. Therefore, where there is not the like Institution, there is not a like reason. And therefore, this opinion of Analogy in positive Rites from a parity of reason without Institution in the new Testament is a mere fancy, and no good ground for an argument.

To apply it to the case in hand, Circumcision and Baptism are merely positive ordinances; Mr. Baxter calls them, p. 9. Positives about worship. Generally, Sacraments by Divines are reckoned among mere positives; Chamier. Panstr. Cath. Tom. 4. l. 2. c. 12. Sect. 20. nulla vera ratio Sacramentorum potest consistere absque institutione. l. 7. c. 10. Sect. 1. nullum Sacramentum est à natura sua, itaque prorsus ab institutione. The places are innumerable in Protestant writers and others to prove this; were it not that I find my Antagonists often forget what is elsewhere yielded by them, I should not say so much, the thing being so plain, that there is nothing natural or moral in them, because till they were appointed (which was thousands of years after the creation) they were not used, nor taken for signs of that which they signified. The reason, then, of Baptism and Circumcision is merely Institution; if then there be not the like Institution, there is not the like reason.

This argument is confirmed by Mr. Marshall’s grant, Defence, pag. 92. 182. the formal reason of the Jews being circumcised was the Command of God. Therefore there is not the like reason of Infant-baptism as of Infant-circumcision without the like command of God. But there is no express command for Infant-baptism as Mr. Marshall confesses, therefore there is not par ratio, like reason of the one as the other.

2. I thus argue,

If all the Laws and Commands about the Sacraments, positive Rites and Ceremonies of the Jews, be now abrogated, then no argument upon supposed analogy or parity of reason from the institution of those abrogated Rites can prove a binding rule to us about a mere positive Rite of the new Testament.

For how can that make a binding rule to us about another mere positive Rite without any other Institution, which itself is abrogated? That which binds not at all, binds not about another thing, v. g. Baptism.

But all the Laws and Commands about the Sacraments, positive Rites and Ceremonies of the Jews, are now abrogated, as is proved in my Examen, part. 3. sect. 12. and confessed by the Assembly Conf. of faith, chap. 19. art. 3.

Ergo none of them bind.

This argument is confirmed by the words of Mr. Cawdrey Sabbat. Rediv. part. 2. chap. 7. sect. 7. pag. 263. No ceremonial commandment can infer a moral commandment. The reason of our assertion is this, because partial commandments given to some Nation or persons (as the Ceremonial precepts were) cannot infer a general to oblige others, even all the world. Again, Sect. 10. pag. 276. First it is so in all other like special and ceremonial Commandments concerning days, whensoever the particular day was abrogated, the whole Commandment concerning that day was utterly abolished, the Law of Circumcision and of the Passover is expired as well as the sacramental and ceremonial actions commanded by that law.

This [issue] Mr. Marshall conceived he had prevented by supposing that in some commands about the Sacraments of the Jews, are some things that belong to the substance of the Covenant, and limiting his assertion to those. And when in my Examen pag. 115. I argued, that in no good sense it can be true that some of the commands of God about the Sacraments of the Jews contained things belonging to the substance of the Covenant, he tells us pag. 198, 199. of his Defence, that our Sacraments have the same substance with theirs, the same general nature, end, and use; which he makes in these things, theirs were seals of the Covenant, so ours, &c.

But none of all these are to the purpose, his allegations tending only to prove that our Sacraments and the Jews have the same general nature, which he calls substance, but not a word to show that any command about them belonged to the substance of the Covenant. But as if he were angry, or did disdain a man should question his dictates, only recites his meaning, and a passage or two of Protestant Authors, and never answers a word to my objection, Exam. pag. 115. that in no good sense could it be true that some commands of God about the Sacraments of the Jews did contain things belonging to the substance of the Covenant.

Yea when I animadverted on that saying in his Sermon, the manner of administration of this Covenant was first by types, shadows and sacrifices, &c. It had been convenient to have named Circumcision, that it might not be conceived to belong to the substance of the Covenant: I reply, saith he, in his Defence, pag. 99. this is a very small quarrel, I added, &c. which supplies both Circumcision and other things. Which words in the plain construction of them do note, that Circumcision is comprehended in his “&c.” as belonging to the manner of administration, not to the substance of the Covenant. And yet pag. 187. he has these words, I have already proved (that is nowhere, no not so much as in attempt) that Circumcision though a part of their administration did yet belong to the substance (meaning of the Covenant of grace) belong to it, I say, not as a part of it, but as a means of applying it. So uncertain and interfering one another are his speeches about this thing.

And yet this salve he adds is not true in any sense in which the word “substance” may be taken. For if he mean by “applying the Covenant” the signifying Christ to come, or the spiritual part promised, so Circumcision was a Type or shadow, and therefore according to his doctrine belonging to the administration that then was, not to the substance of the Covenant; if he mean by “applying the Covenant” sealing or assuring the righteousness of faith to men’s consciences, neither does this make it of the substance of the Covenant, the Covenant being made before. And though Circumcision had never thus applied it, the substance of the Covenant had been the same, yea the Covenant was the same in substance, according to his own doctrine, 2000 years before Circumcision did apply it to any.

Now I do not conceive any thing is to be said of the substance of a thing, when the thing may be entire without it; so that in this point I deprehend in Mr. Marshall’s speeches nothing but dictates; and those very uncertain and confused.

2. Secondly, says he, pag. 198. When I say that God’s Commands about their Sacraments bind us, my meaning never was to assert, that the ritual part of their Sacraments do remain in the least particle, or that we are tied to practice any of those things, but only that there is a general and analogical nature, wherein the Sacraments of the Old and New Testament do agree, which he thus a little before expresses, my meaning being plainly this, that all God’s Commands and Institutions about the Sacraments of the Jews as touching their general nature of being Sacraments and Seals of the Covenant, and as touching their use and end, do bind us in our Sacraments, because they are the same.

Whereto I reply, that Mr. Marshall supposes the Commands of God are about the general nature of being Sacraments and Seals of the Covenant: which is a most vain conceit, there being no such Command or Institution, there’s no such Command that Sacraments should have the general nature of Sacraments, or be Seals of the Covenant, or that they should signify Christ and seal spiritual grace. These things they have from their nature, as he says, which is the same without any Institution.

The natures, essences and quiddities of things are eternal, invariable, and so come not under Command, which reaches only to things contingent, that may be done, or not be done. Did ever any wise man command to men that man should be a reasonable living body, or whiteness a visible quality, or fatherhood a relation? And to say that God commands Sacraments to seal the Covenant, what is this but to say that God commands himself? For he alone by the Sacraments seals to us the Covenant or Promise of Christ, or grace by him. All Commands of God are concerning what the persons commanded should do, and they must needs be of particulars, not of generals, for actio est singularium, action is of singular persons and things. Though God may command man to think or acknowledge Sacraments to be Seals of the Covenant, yet it were a most vain thing for God to command that Sacraments should be Seals of the Covenant, or to have this general end or use, to seal or signify Christ, and spiritual grace, to us, which belongs only to himself to do by his declaration of his meaning in them. Such Commands as Mr. Marshall imagines, are a mere Chimaera, or dream of his brain.

Secondly, the like is to be said concerning his conceit, that such Commands bind us in our Sacraments; For to bind us is to determine what is to be done, or not to be done by us; But such imagined Commands do not determine what is to be done or not to be done by us, and therefore cannot bind at all.

Thirdly, when Mr. Marshall. confesses we are not tied to the least particle of the ritual part or any practice of those things, he does thereby acknowledge that all the Commands of God about the Sacraments of the Jews, which were all about rituals, are quite abrogated. For all Sacraments are Rites or Ceremonies, and to imagine a Command about a Sacrament, and not about a ritual part or Ceremony, is to imagine a Command about a Sacrament, which is not a Sacrament, Chamier. Panstr. Cathol. Tom. 4. lib. 1. chap. 8. Sect. 9. arguing against Suarez the Jesuit, that dreamed of a Sacrament appointed in the law of nature for remedy of original sin, yet had no determined Ceremony, speaks thus; Sacramentum aliquod insti∣tutum à Deo, Ceremonia nulla determinata à Deo, quis capiat? Sacramentum institui et Ceremoniam non determinari? Aequè dixerit loquutum esse deum, et tamen vocem nullam protulisse, nam aequè Sacramenti genus est Ceremonia et Vox loqisutionis.

Fourthly, were it supposed that there were some Commands about the general nature of Sacraments, binding us, though every particle and practice of the ritual part be abrogated, yet this would not reach Mr. Marshall’s intent, which is to prove the Command of sealing Infants with the initial seal in force, binds. But to seal Infants with the initial seal in force is not of the general nature of Sacraments (for then it should belong to the after seal as well as the initiating) but after his own dictates of the special nature of the initial seal, and so Mr. Marshall’s principle serves not for his purpose.

3. Thirdly, I argued thus, Examen. part. 2. sect. 8.

If we may frame an addition to God’s worship from analogy or resemblance conceived by us between two ordinances, whereof one is quite taken away, without any Institution gathered by precept or Apostolical example, then a certain rule may be set down from God’s word how far a man may go in his conceived parity of reason, equity, or analogy, and where he must stay;

For to use the words of the Author, whose book is intitled Grallæ, if Christians must measure their worship according to the Institution and Ceremonies of the Jews, it is needfull that either they imitate them in all things, or else that some “O Edipus” resolve this riddle hitherto not resolved, to wit, what is moral and imitable in those Ceremonies, and what not.

But out of God’s word no rule can be framed to resolve us how far we must or may not go in this conceived parity of reason, equity, or analogy,

Ergo.

The major is evinced from the perfection of God’s word, and the providence of God to have the consciences of his people rightly guided. The minor is proved by provoking those analogists that determine from the Commands about the Mosaical Rites and usages what must be done or may not be done about the mere positive worship and Church-order of the New Testament, to set down this rule out of God’s word.

This argument is confirmed by experience in the controversy between Presbyterians and Independents, jarring about the extent of Infant-baptism, the Elders in new England, Mr. Hooker, (besides Mr. Firmin) Mr. Bartlet, &c. restraining it to the Infants of members joined in a Church gathered after the congregational way as it is called. Mr. Cawdrey, Mr. Blake, Mr. Rutherfurd and others extend it farther, master Baxter. Plain scripture proof, &c. chap. 29. part 1. pag. 101. to all whosoever they be, if they be at a believer’s dispose.

And both sides pretend analogy, which being uncertain, Mr. Ball after much debate about this difference, as distrusting analogy, determines thus in his reply to the answer of the new England Elders to the 9. posit. posit. 3. and 4 pag. 38. But in whatsoever Circumcision and Baptism do agree or differ (which is as much as to say, whatsoever their analogy or resemblance be) we must look to the Institution (therefore the Institution of each Sacrament must be our rule in the use of them, not analogy, and analogy is not sufficient to guide us without Institution, and to shew that analogy serves not turn of itself to determine who are to be baptized, he adds) and neither stretch it wider, nor draw it narrower than the Lord has made it, for he is the Institutor of the Sacraments according to his own good pleasure, and it is our part to learn of him, both to whom, how, and for what end the Sacraments are to be administered, how they agree, and wherein they differ, in all which we must affirm nothing but what God hath taught us, and as he has taught us. Which how they cut the sinews of the argument from Circumcision to Baptism, without wrong to master Ball, is shewed in my Apology, Sect. 13. pag. 57.

Mr. Marshall. in his Defence, pag. 83. Mr. Blake pag. 74, 75. of his answer to my letter, seem to deny, that Paedobaptists do frame an addition to God’s worship from such analogy, the contrary whereof is manifest from the passages cited before. But Mr. Blake over and above, pag. 75. sets down three cautions, which being observed, then this kind of arguing from analogy and proportion is without any such pretended danger. The insufficiency of which cautions being shown in my Postscript to the Apology, Sect 17 pag. 143. I conceive it unnecessary to repeat my words.

Reformed Credobaptism

In this post, I want to investigate the relation of faith to baptism in the Reformed tradition, and how it relates to modern discussions and debates.

Common Argument: Sacraments are God’s word to us, not our word to God

In my experience with debates about credobaptism vs. paedobaptism, one of the common arguments that modern Reformed Christians direct toward Baptists is that Baptists misunderstand the nature of sacraments. The common argument goes like this:

Sacraments are God’s word to us, not our profession of faith to God. Infant Baptism fits this perfectly because it is a picture of God’s grace promised to a helpless individual. Baptists turn baptism into a work performed by man, rather than a sign of divine grace given by God.

Let’s be clear, up front. It would be very easy to provide numerous examples of Baptists laying a heavy emphasis on baptism as man’s profession of faith to God. And it would also be easy to say that in such cases there is an omission and neglect of appreciating sacraments as God’s word to his people. I grant this in full, and Baptists need to do a much better job at teaching and appreciating sacraments as God’s word to his people.

However, do Reformed Christians fall into the same mistake, but on the opposite side? Do they, by emphasizing God’s grace signified to man in the sacraments, neglect and omit man’s side in the use of sacraments? The Reformed of the 16th and 17th centuries did not. But (if experience can be the gauge here) the modern Reformed do, frequently.

The Reformed: Sacraments are Mutual Testimonies

The Reformed of the Reformation and Post-Reformation eras clearly assert a mutuality in sacraments.

John Calvin, for example, defined a sacrament as:

“a testimony of God’s favor towards us confirmed by an outward sign, with a mutual testifying of our godliness toward him.”

John Calvin, The Institvtion of Christian Religion (London: Reinolde Wolfe and Richard Harrison, 1561), fol. 90v. (IV. 13. 1). Cf. also fols. 94v-95r. (IV. 13. 13-14).

And William Perkins offered a similar definition:

“Baptism serves to be a pledge unto us in respect of our weakness, of all the graces and mercies of God, and especially of our union with Christ, of remission of sins, and of mortification. Secondly, it serves to be a sign of Christian profession before the world, and therefore it is called ‘the stipulation or interrogation of a good conscience,’ 1 Pet. 3:21.”

William Perkins, A Commentarie or Exposition, upon the five first Chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians (Cambridge: John Legat, 1604), 249.

And Lucas Trelcatius offered the same:

“By the name of Sacrament, we understand a signe of grace, ordained of God, that he might both seal up his benefits in us, and consecrate us to himself for ever; for in the signification of Sacrament, there is a mutual respect: the one on God’s behalf offering grace; the other on man’s behalf, promising thankfulness.”

Lucas Trelcatius, A Briefe institution of the Common Places of Sacred Divinitie (London: T.P. for Francis Burton, 1610), 293. Spelling updated.

These statements may seem to create a tension with infant baptism. How can an infant participate in the mutuality of the sacrament?

The Reformed: Faith is a Prerequisite for Baptism

For many paedobaptists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the mutual nature of sacraments was not an obstacle. They did not hesitate to connect baptism with a profession of faith, even in the case of infants. In fact, they required faith for baptism.

One way to handle this was to have sponsors answer for the child. This was the doctrine of the church of England. Sponsors profess faith and repentance for the child. You can read about it in this post.

The Westminster Assembly debated this issue and concluded that it was necessary for parents to make a profession of faith in the baptism of their children. You can read about it in the post just linked above. The Assembly’s decision relocates the profession of faith. It is not the child’s faith professed by sponsors, but the parents’ faith.

The Church of England and the Westminster Assembly were not alone in requiring faith in baptism. Edward Polhill noted that the Leiden Synopsis (its title is Synopsis Purioris Theologiæ, the work of Johannes Polyander, Andreas Rivetus, Antonius Walaeus, and Anthonius Thysius), first published in 1625, likewise required faith in infants prior to baptism.

Edward Polhill - Christus in Corde - 206

These are not the views of an isolated or idiosyncratic Reformed writer. The Westminster Assembly and the Leiden Synopsis are collaborative projects of some of the best minds the Reformed faith has ever known. But what does the Leiden Synopsis actually say about baptism, faith, and infant baptism?

The Leiden Synopsis: Infants of the Faithful have the Seed of Faith

I’ve translated relevant portions of Disputation 44, “Of the Sacrament of Baptism.” I don’t claim to be a Latinist, so feel free to check or correct my work in comparison to the original here. This portion of the Synopsis should be released in translation this year.

Though not exactly germane to this discussion, we can note that the Leiden divines makes immersion or pouring an indifferent matter, as well as whether to dip/pour once or thrice.

Thesis 19. And whether the baptizand should be dipped once, or three times, is judged a thing indifferent in the Christian church, as also whether by immersion or aspersion.

Moving on to their theology of infant baptism, here are relevant portions. Edward Polhill’s quote above was referring to Thesis 29.

Thesis 28. No valid distinction can be made between the baptism of adults and infants, except that the baptism of adults is a sign and seal of regeneration already possessed, and the baptism of infants is the instrument of the beginning of regeneration. There is no foundation for any difference beyond this in all Scripture, which acknowledges but one kind of baptism only…

Thesis 29. Therefore we do not align the efficacy of baptism with the moment of its administration, when the body is dipped in the water, but in all persons baptized we do require beforehand faith and repentance, though with the judgment of charity. And this is just as true in the case of covenant infants, in whom, by virtue of the divine blessings and covenant of the gospel, the seed and spirit of faith and repentance are present, we contend, just as in adults, for whom profession of actual faith and repentance is necessary. For as when a seed is cast in the earth, it does not always grow to its height immediately, but [it grows] when rain and warmth come upon it from the sky, neither is the efficacy of the sacramental sign always tied to its first moment, but in the passage of time, with the blessing of the Holy Spirit, is it granted.

Thesis 47. Second, we count [as valid subjects of baptism] infants who are born of faithful and federal parents, according to the promise of God, Genesis 17 “I will be God to you and your seed.” […] To whom the thing signified pertains, no one can deny the sign. […] Now then truly none can deny that the benefits of the blood and Spirit of Christ belong to the infants of the faithful, except those [children] who choose to exclude themselves from salvation; neither is anyone able to enter the kingdom of God unless they are regenerated by water and Spirit, John 3:5. For no one is of Christ who does not have his Spirit, Romans 8:9.

Thesis 48. Ephesians 5:26 is a confirming illustration of this, where the apostle says “Christ loved his church, and gave himself up for her, cleansing her in the washing of water through the word.” From which it follows that the infants of the faithful are not born into a different church from the one for which Christ gave himself, and which he cleansed with the washing of water through the word.

The idea that baptism and faith go hand in hand is not at all a tension for those who believe that the infants of the faithful possess “the benefits of the blood and Spirit of Christ” and have “the seed and spirit of faith and repentance.”

Some Reformed: Infants of the Faithful Have a Distinct, Provisional, Perishable, Regeneration

The doctrine that the infants of the faithful possess the seed of faith creates another tension. What does it mean for covenant children to possess the seed of faith and the blessings and benefits of Christ, and yet “to choose to exclude themselves” from salvation? Also, are the infants of the faithful not born in Adam?

There are varying answers to these questions among paedobaptists. Joseph Whiston lays out various options in this post. Whiston’s option is that the infants of the faithful have a provisional regeneration that is distinct in kind from the ordinary regeneration that believers experience.

For Whiston, and some Reformed, their infants, by virtue of the federal holiness they enjoy as children of the faithful, are cleansed of original sin, and are therefore guaranteed to enter Heaven if they die in their infancy.

For some sources on the discussion and pedigree of such views, see this post, this post, and the related (though later) discussion of sources here:

Conclusions

We can make the following conclusions:

First, the common caricature of “The Reformed make baptism God’s word to us, and Baptists make baptism man’s word to God” demonstrates that both sides need a lesson in historical theology.  There is no reason why Baptists should not appreciate and enjoy the sacraments, first and foremost, as God’s promises made visible to his people. Likewise, the Reformed should not hesitate to say that participation in the sacraments is a mutual testimony, from man to God.

Second, related to this, the common caricature that Baptists connect faith too closely to baptism must be applied equally to the Westminster and Leiden divines. They require faith for baptism. It simply isn’t a “Baptist” move. A distinction can be made between fidebaptism, and credobaptism. The Reformed baptize based on faith (fidebaptism), not necessarily profession of faith (credobaptism). However, that would only apply to infants. The Reformed would practice fidebaptism for infants, and credobaptism for adults.

Third, the modern Reformed departure/distancing from (what I perceive as) the more robust forms of paedobaptism explains some of the tensions with so-called “Federal Vision” ideas. Like it nor not, in some cases, certain tenets of the more “Federal Vision” flavor of paedobaptists are not so much a departure from the Reformed tradition as they are a return to one of its more robust forms.

Fourth, modern Reformed Christians need to recognize that the common argument of “We baptize based on the promise to us and our children” is anemic in comparison to “We baptize on the basis of God’s covenant with us, by virtue of which our children are provisionally cleansed and have the seed of faith.” In the modern Reformed version, what is actually true of a covenant child? Promises are made to the child, but is there any way to say, definitely, that any given infant has actual possession of any benefit? I have a feeling that in the social media circles I know, any Reformed Christian who began to assert objective benefits for their covenant children would be swiftly and strongly denounced by other Reformed Christians.

Fifth, the modern Reformed version of paedobaptism creates a tension between infant and adult baptism (to use the Leiden Synopsis’ categories). As the Leiden Synopsis states, its version of infant baptism is very much in line with adult baptism. Both presuppose cleansing; both require repentance and faith. But the common modern Reformed version of paedobaptism makes paedobaptism, as William Cunningham said,

“a peculiar, subordinate, supplemental, exceptional thing, which stands indeed firmly based on its own distinct and special grounds.” (The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation)

For Reformed Baptists (i.e., 2LCF Baptists), there is, as the Leiden Synopsis states, “but one kind of baptism only” acknowledged by the Scriptures. That is credobaptism, baptism based on profession of faith, not age. Are the modern Reformed ready to embrace the older Reformed credobaptism and bring their adult and infant baptism  into realignment? Or will they practice credobaptism for adults, and something else for their children?

John Owen, Unto the Questions, 7

Are the Covenant Promises Definite? A Pædobaptist Discussion

In the debates of credobaptism vs. pædobaptism in the seventeenth century, a great number of books and pamphlets were produced. These, in turn, have led to a corresponding quantity of secondary literature about the two sides of the debate. When looking at the sides as opposites, one of the features that can disappear from view is the diversity of each side.

It has been my experience (and this is a vague generality) that pædobaptists are often unaware or at least disinterested in the diversity of their own tradition. Baptists are equally liable to this deficiency, but in this post I want to present a pædobaptist speaking to pædobaptists in the context of the credo vs. pædo debates.

Joseph Whiston (d.1690), a Congregationalist (or Independent) minister of Lewes, Sussex wrote several works advocating pædobaptism and criticizing credobaptism. He interacted with Henry Danvers (not a Particular Baptist), Edward Hutchinson, Thomas Delaune, and Nehemiah Coxe (all three were Particular Baptists). John Flavel commended Whiston’s contribution to this ongoing debate.

In one such work published in 1676, An Essay to Revive the Primitive Doctrine and Practice of Infant-Baptism, Whiston initiated a discussion about the definiteness of the covenant. Are the promises made definitely or indefinitely to the infant-seed of believers? The context of this discussion was the Baptist criticism of the pædobaptist covenantal system that if the promise is made to the children, and yet not all children come to faith and salvation, then God is unfaithful to his promises and the covenant is not sure.

Whiston’s solution is surprising, and I believe that most, if not all, my pædobaptist friends today would reject it. But what is equally surprising is that for Whiston, the model that I would consider the common position then, and now, is untenable. Whiston considers it indefensible. I am genuinely curious to know how my modern pædobaptist friends would respond to Whiston. And, without desiring to be provocative, I also wonder to what extent my pædobaptist friends have faced the issue Whiston is addressing without retreating to generalities and formulae.

If you read the portions below and more of Whiston’s work itself, you will see that one of the recurring factors of Whiston’s argument is how ministers handle the death of the infants of believers. On what ground do ministers reassure parents of the salvation of their dear deceased little ones? If the covenant is not made definitely with the seed, and if they do not all enjoy the promises made in the covenant, how can ministers speak in this way?

I have transcribed relevant sections below, updated spelling in general, and to some degree divided his paragraphs into more natural divisions (as I read his argument). All bracketed content is mine. You can see the original through the link above.

So, here follows Joseph Whiston’s words as a pædobaptist to pædobaptists regarding the definiteness of the covenant of grace as it is made with the infants of believers. He begins by setting out varying positions, then advocating his own in contrast with the rest.

It may not be unuseful, but seems necessary, that I should give a brief account of the different apprehensions of pædo-baptists themselves about the nature of the covenant and promises, as entered with, and made to the infant-seed of believers, because that they are not all of one mind and judgment about that must be granted. And according to their different apprehensions about the nature of the covenant and promises, they are differently persuaded as to the good accruing to infants by their covenant-interest, and their having the token of the covenant applied to them.

Some conceive that the covenant is entered with the seed of believers only indefinitely, and answerably that the promises appertaining to them are to be interpreted and understood in an indefinite notion; that is, as having a respect to them as generally and collectively considered, but not made to any of them in particular. And of those that go this way, some conceive that the covenant and promises appertain only to the elect, and secure to them only the future enjoyment of all the saving fruits and benefits purchased by Christ; but do not necessarily convey to, or confer upon them any of those fruits or benefits for the present, and consequently, that by the application of the token of the covenant, only jus ad rem [a right to the thing], not jus in re [a right in the thing] is sealed and confirmed.

Others conceive that as the covenant and promises thereof have only an indefinite respect to the seed of believers, so that at least some of them have those saving benefits and blessings actually granted to and conferred upon them, and consequently that they are actually regenerated, and have a full and complete union with Christ, the remission of sins, the love and favor of God, &c. And some having these benefits and blessings actually conferred upon them in their infancy, we are to presume it may be so with each one in particular; and on that ground are to apply the token of the covenant to them universally.

And this opinion, could it be clearly proved from Scripture, would free the controversy about infant baptism from many difficulties it must be confessed it is otherwise attended with: but for the reasons after to be given, I cannot, but at present lay it aside cum pace tantorum virorum [with respect to such great men].

Secondly, others conceive that the covenant is entered with the seed of believers definitely, and answerably that the promises appertaining to them are to be interpreted and understood in a definite notion; and consequently, that as the covenant, as at first established with Abraham, did extend to Ishmael, as well as to Isaac, so is still continued to all believers, and each one of their seed in particular.

And some of these that go this way conceive, that all the infants of believers have true grace, in particular true faith, wrought in them either antecedent to the application of the token of the covenant, or at the time of its application, if not by, yet in a concurrence with it. But this opinion necessarily inferring a possibility to lose, and fall from the truth of Grace, is rejected by the generality of Protestants, especially that bear the denomination of Calvinists.

Yet some grant, yea assert some kind of supernatural operations of the Spirit to antecede, at least accompany the application of the token of the covenant to them, whereby at least a posse agere [an ability to act though not actually acting], or some dispositions facilitating their saving acting of grace are wrought.

But others distinguish of the covenant: it is say they, internum, aut externum, it is either internal, or external: by the internal covenant, they seem to mean the covenant as really and truly entered with the elect, ensuring to them grace and glory: by the external covenant they seem to mean the covenant as visibly appearing to be made with men, whether infants, or adult, when as it is not indeed really entered mutually between God and them. This latter way of God’s entering covenant with men, whether young or old, is expressed by some, by entering covenant with them in or according to an ecclesiastical dispensation, that is, as they express themselves in a visible church way.

Again others, and sometimes the same men distinguish of the good contained in and conveyed by the promises of the covenant appertaining to the seed of believers: it is, say they, either spiritual and saving, or else only external and ecclesiastical; as membership in the visible church, a right to the outward ordinances and privileges of the church, and the like. And they conceive that the covenant, as containing saving spiritual mercies, only appertains to the elect; but, as containing external ecclesiastical privileges, it appertains to all the seed of believers: hence they call it, as entered with them, a covenant of privileges.

This latter opinion concerning the definiteness of the covenant I take to be according to truth, though to distinguish either of the covenant or the good contained in it, as entered with, or extended to infants, I see no ground, neither do I think it is at all necessary; but I say, as to the nature of the covenant, I doubt not, but that it is entered with, and extended to the infant-seed of believers definitely, and answerably [correspondingly] that the promises appertaining to them are to be interpreted and understood in a definite notion, as appertaining equally and alike to each one in particular: I speak of the covenant and promises, as entered with and made to the seed of believers merely as such.

There are, it’s true, some promises of the covenant appertaining unto them, which are to be interpreted and understood in an indefinite notion, as has been afore declared; but those appertain not to them merely as the seed of such parents, but as members of the visible church. (100-103)

What follows is a part of Whiston’s defense of his position that the covenant is made with the seed of believers definitely.

That which is firstly and primarily ratified sealed and confirmed to infants (and the same is true of the adult) by the application of the token of the covenant to them, is the covenant it self, as more generally and absolutely considered; and consequently, and as the immediate and necessary result thereof, that which is ratified and confirmed is their covenant-state. They are (as I may so speak) solemnly invested and settled in a covenant-state with God; they are absolutely de presenti [in the present] removed from under the first covenant entered with all mankind in Adam, and solemnly invested with, and initiated into a new covenant-state. Hence circumcision (and the same is true of Baptism) is said to be the token of the covenant, as absolutely considered, Gen. 17.11 as the one had, so the other has a first and primary respect and reference to the covenant as absolutely taken; and consequentially to the state of those that are taken into covenant; they are thereby solemnly put, and settled in a new covenant-state and relation Godward: though I deny not, but that the new covenant or covenant of grace is conditionally made with all or rather offered to mankind; there is an offer and tender of Christ with all his benefits to all men upon condition of faith and repentance…

But the seed of Believers are actually received into the covenant of grace, solemnized, ratified, and confirmed by the application of the token of the covenant to them and from this change in their states I conceive a discharge and immunity from the condemning power of original sin, whether originans or originatum [the original sin of Adam, and the pollution of nature resulting from Adam’s sin], does necessarily arise and result unto them.

All those that are actually under the covenant of grace, as definitely entered with them, are de presenti [in the present] freed from [the covenant of works], seeing there is an absolute inconsistency between being under the law, and under grace, at one and the same time. The Apostle, Rom. 6.14 sets these two states in a direct antithesis or opposition the one to the other; whether we understand by law here, the mosaical law, or the law as given at Mount Sinai, wherein there was a revival of the law of works made with Adam in innocency, or that first law or covenant as so made with Adam; yet by grace I conceive we must understand the covenant of grace, and then ’tis all one as to my present purpose: no man can be under two covenants that are in nature or kind directly opposite the one to the other, at one and the same time. Hence I say, the infants of believers, being under the covenant of grace, they must needs be set free from the first covenant in the same sense that all believers are.

And as for the covenant of grace that threatens condemnation against none but either final rejecters of it, as in the case of those that are yet strangers to it, or total and final violators of it, as in case of those that are actually under it, and being free from the sanction of the first covenant, and not under any obligation to suffer future condemnation, either as rejecters, or violators of the second, I conceive their immunity from the condemning power of original sin, yea of whatever sin, whether original or actual they fall under the guilt of, during their pure infant-states, must necessarily ensue, though no express promise of pardon (which I conceive it is not necessary to enquire after) should appertain unto them, cessante obligatione legis & non obligante novo foedere [the threat of the law having ceased, and not under the threats of the new covenant], there can be no condemnation to them on the account of any sin chargeable upon them. (111-114)

At the heart of Whiston’s position is not just the mutual exclusivity of the covenants of works and grace, but also the simple logic of what it means to be in a covenant. He says that we cannot say our children are in the covenant unless we likewise affirm that they enjoy the benefits of the covenant.

Those that have no good, that is of the essence and substance of the covenant, have no present interest in the covenant. but unless infants have that good afore declared, they have no good that is of the essence and substance of the covenant. Ergo. This argument in the whole of it is so obvious to every ordinary understanding, at least [it] will so evidently appear upon a diligent search, that I shall surcease the proof of it. (154)

Similarly, Whiston argued that an indefinite promise to children is an insufficient ground for the application of the token.

And hence, by the way, how can a supposal of [the covenant being made indefinitely with the seed of believers] be a sufficient ground for the application of the token of the covenant, of which the covenant gives no assurance? (177)

Whiston again argues against an indefinite model by answering an objection.

Objection. It will be said, ‘Tis true the infant-seed of believers, and that universally, visibly appear to us, and may be hoped according to a judgment of charity, to have all that good, and all those benefits and privileges afore assigned to them, as they are the seed of such parents, conferred upon and ensured to them by the covenant, as confirmed by the application of the token thereof to them, but that they have all that good, and all those benefits and privileges really and truly actually granted to, and conferred upon them in their pure infant-state, is more than we can affirm; inasmuch as secret things belong to God, but things revealed to us and our chidlren.

Answer. I confess, most that have pleaded for Infant-baptism upon this ground, viz. their interest in the covenant, do too commonly express themselves to this purpose, but it seems past all rational doubt, and is so to me, that what they visibly appear to have by virtue of their interest in the covenant, that they have in reality and truth. (181)

Natural questions arise, of course, as to how Whiston’s definite covenant model handles the children of believers that abandon the faith. He argues that though the infant seed of believers are freed from original sin’s guilt and pollution, they are not necessarily regenerated, nor do they have the Holy Spirit.

For that which may yet further be pleaded, namely, the improbability that any should be in covenant with the Holy Spirit, and yet have no benefit by him, either in regard of any saving, no, nor any common operations that have a direct conducency [leading connection] to their future salvation. To that I would say in the general, that how improbable soever this may seem to be, yet no sound argument can be drawn therefrom, to prove the conclusion inferred in the forementioned objection. God may receive the infant-seed of believers into covenant with himself, and that universally, and vouchsafe them all the good and all the privileges afore assigned to them, and yet it will not necessarily follow from thence, that any such operations of the Spirit should be granted to them. (168)

The covenant doth not assure any of regeneration in their infancy, as they are Elect, for then all the elect seed of believers should be regenerated in their infancy; the contrary whereunto is evident, in that many of the seed of believers, in whom there is not the least shew or appearance of grace from their very infancy till they come to full age, yea possibly till they come to old age, are yet at last converted and brought to a saving close with Christ. (178)

And when the children of believers come of age, they can “willfully sin away their mercies.” (180) This is possible, Whiston says, because “The covenant of grace is immutable, when the Spirit, which renders it so, is actually given.” (185)

The extent to which Whiston represents anyone beyond himself is an important question, though he does appeal to “the generality, if not the universality of all the ancients, and many of our modern divines, as the Lutherans, the Divines of the Synod of Dordt, with many others” to support his argument for the “immunity from the condemning power of original sin” for the infants of believers (117).

But I bring his writing to light as a way of reorienting the polarity of polemics. Whiston’s criticisms of the indefinite model of how God covenants with the children of believers are based on the same premises used by the Particular Baptists to make similar arguments. For example, Nehemiah Coxe said,

Nehemiah Coxe, A Discourse, 129

And Hercules Collins argued that if pædobaptists will only go so far as saying that their children are externally or visibly in the covenant, and the rest is left to God, that is, if the covenant is only made indefinitely…

“If we ask what they mean by Infants of Believers being in the Covenant of Grace? They answer, they are in the External part of the covenant; if you ask, what is that? They say, the Administration of the Covenant; if you ask, what is that? They will tell you it is Baptism; so that the whole amounts to no more than this, such children they ought to be baptized, because they ought to be baptized.”

This discussion is the same context for the Particular Baptists’ criticisms of the Westminster catechism’s description of baptism and the covenant of grace relative to union with Christ and the relation of infants to the same.

So, I query, is the covenant made definitely or indefinitely with the infant seed of believers? If we grant the formula “I will be a God to you and your children” to be a general formula belonging to all believers, is this formula and promise definite or indefinite?